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Abstract In market-based health care systems, channel-
ing patients to designated preferred providers can increase
payer’s bargaining clout, other things being equal. In the
unique setting of the new Dutch health care system with
regulated competition, this paper evaluates the impact of a
1-year natural experiment with patient channeling on pro-
viders’ market shares. In 2009 a large regional Dutch
health insurer designated preferred providers for two dif-
ferent procedures (cataract surgery and varicose veins
treatment) and gave its enrollees a positive financial
incentive for choosing them. That is, patients were
exempted from paying their deductible when they went to a
preferred provider. Using claims data over the period
2007–2009, we apply a difference-in-difference approach
to study the impact of this channeling strategy on the
allocation of patients across individual providers. Our
estimation results show that, in the year of the experiment,
preferred providers of varicose veins treatment on average
experienced a significant increase in patient volume rela-
tive to non-preferred providers. However, for cataract
surgery no significant effect is found. Possible explanations
for the observed difference between both procedures may
be the insurer’s selection of preferred providers and the
design of the channeling incentive resulting in different
expected financial benefits for both patient groups.
Keywords Preferred providers  Patient channeling 
Difference-in-difference
JEL Classification I11  I13  C23
Introduction
In several countries, deregulation of pricing and the rise of
managed care have led to a market-based health care sys-
tem in which health care providers typically negotiate
contracts separately with each third-party payer.1 From the
perspective of the payer, forming limited or tiered provider
networks is a strategic choice to create competition among
providers. It may endow the health insurer or other third-
party payer with the power to negotiate better deals with
providers. The promise of an extra volume of patients may
stimulate providers to offer more favorable contract terms
(such as price discounts and quality improvements) to the
insurer than its competitors do. Sorensen [25] and Wu [28]
attempted to empirically measure the effect of ‘moving
market share’ to preferred providers on negotiated price
discounts. Their findings suggest that health insurers which
are better able to channel patients to preferred providers
can indeed negotiate better deals with hospitals.
Another health care sector with a similar bargaining
setting is the wholesale market for pharmaceuticals.
Research by Ellison and Snyder [5] suggest that negotiated
discounts in this industry are sensitive to buyers’ abilities
to substitute across competing drug products. To influence
consumer choice of prescription drugs, health insurers use
formularies and financial incentives. For example, patients
pay lower or no copayments when they choose drugs that
are preferred by their health insurer. Several studies show
that these financial incentives are effective at both
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changing prescribing patterns and moving market share to
preferred drugs [8–10, 14].
Other than for prescription drugs, financial incentives
are also increasingly used to influence patient choice of
health care provider. These incentives include, for exam-
ple, (i) charging differential copayments across provider
tiers, (ii) requiring percentage coinsurance which auto-
matically tiers providers according to price, or (iii) estab-
lishing a reimbursement limit which requires the patient to
pay the difference between this limit and the insurer-pro-
vider negotiated price [15, 16].2 Generally speaking, we
expect that channeling patients to preferred health care
providers is more difficult than for pharmaceuticals,
because of typically less observable differences in clinical
and non-clinical quality and patients’ distance (travel time)
to alternative providers.
To date, the health economics literature provides only
limited evidence based on real world data that financial
incentives (i.e. cost sharing differences across providers)
are effective at encouraging patients to choose preferred
providers. Scanlon et al. [20] examined whether waiving
standard coinsurance for patients who chose safer hospi-
tals, at a large manufacturing company headquartered in
the Midwest of the United States, changed hospital
admissions patterns by estimating patients’ probability of
choosing a specific hospital. Their findings suggest that the
financial incentive significantly influenced patient choice
behavior. Rosenthal et al. [19] studied the effect of
excluding physicians from a preferred provider organiza-
tion network in the Las Vegas (Nevada) metropolitan area
resulting in higher out-of-pocket payments to see an out-of-
network physician. They found that this network narrowing
indeed reduced the odds of continuing to see an excluded
physician. Robinson and Brown [17] evaluated the impact
of an initiative with reference pricing (reimbursement
limit) on patient provider choices for orthopedic surgery in
California and concluded that it encouraged patients to
select low-price facilities. In a more recent study, Robinson
et al. [18] examined the effect of another reference-based
benefit design in California that financially encouraged
patients to select lower-price ambulatory surgery centers
for cataract surgery instead of hospital outpatient depart-
ments. Their results show that the introduction of this
benefit design was associated with a significant increase in
patients’ ambulatory surgery center use. Using data from
health plans in Massachusetts, Sinaiko and Rosenthal [23]
assessed whether tier-rankings had an impact on physician
market shares. Overall, they found patients to be quite loyal
to physicians. Patients who stayed with their plan year to
year were no more likely to switch away from lower-tiered
physicians than higher-tiered physicians. The tiering did,
however, appear to impact physician market share through
the channeling of new patient visits away from the lowest-
tiered physicians. Finally, Frank et al. [7] studied a three-
tiered hospital network in Massachusetts employing large
differential cost sharing to encourage patients to seek care
at hospitals in the preferred tier. Their study shows that the
tiered network indeed steered patients toward preferred
hospitals for planned admissions.
Outside the context of the US health care system,
Boonen et al. [2] examined how patients responded to
incentives used by two Dutch health insurers to influence
the choice of pharmacy. Based on the effects found for two
natural experiments, they concluded that patients are sen-
sitive to rather small incentives and that temporary incen-
tives may have a long-term effect on provider choice in the
market for outpatient prescription drugs.
Related to the empirical studies discussed above, this
paper analyzes a natural 1-year experiment in which a
large regional Dutch health insurer designated preferred
providers for two different procedures: cataract surgery
and varicose veins treatment. Its enrollees were given a
positive financial incentive for choosing these providers.
That is, patients were exempted from paying their
deductible when they went to a preferred provider. Using
unique 3-year panel data, we took the providers’ per-
spective and examined whether preferred providers gained
patient volume relative to non-preferred providers caused
by patients acting—at least to some extent—as price
sensitive consumers of health care.3 The paper proceeds
as follows. In ‘‘Background’’ the natural experiment is
presented in detail. ‘‘Data and method’’ describes both the
data and method used for the empirical analysis. In
‘‘Results’’ the estimation results are presented. ‘‘Conclu-
sion and discussion’’ concludes the paper with a discus-
sion of our findings.
Background
In the new Dutch health care system with regulated com-
petition, introduced in 2006, it is mandatory for all citizens
to buy standardized basic health insurance covering the
costs of common medical care including primary care,
2 The latter is known as reference pricing and can be interpreted as a
reverse deductible. The insurer, rather than the enrollee, pays the first
part of the negotiated fee, up to the reimbursement limit, and the
enrollee pays the rest.
3 Note that the patient channeling experiment did not increase the
insurer’s total patient volume because (i) both procedures were only
available to patients after a referral from their general practitioner
based on their medical needs, and (ii) patients were legally not
allowed to switch health insurer during the year 2009 to have their
deductible waived for the procedure.
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hospital services (for up to 1 year), and pharmaceuticals.4
The premium for basic health insurance is community-
rated. Every adult has a mandatory annual deductible
(155 € in 2009) that must be met (excluding primary care
and maternity care) before medical services are reimbursed
by the insurer. Consumers obtain a discount on their pre-
mium if they opt for a voluntary deductible (at most
500 €). These premium discounts may differ by insurer. In
addition to the mandatory deductible and any voluntary
deductible, enrollees pay a copayment (a fixed euro
amount) for some medical care (e.g. durable medical
equipment, certain pharmaceuticals). Overall, from an
international perspective, out-of-pocket health care spend-
ing in the Netherlands was, in 2009, the lowest of all
OECD countries [13].
Competing private health insurers are provided with
financial incentives as well as tools to organize and manage
acute (curative) care for their enrollees by establishing and
maintaining provider networks. Insurers have the legal
discretion to engage in selective contracting. That is, they
are allowed to form limited provider networks. In 2009,
insurers were still very reluctant to limit their provider
network for hospital services. Only one very small health
plan (13,000 enrollees) provided as of January 2008 access
to a limited network of hospitals [11]. An important
explanation for this reluctance was that a vast majority of
enrollees did not believe that insurers with restrictive net-
works were committed to provide good quality care [3].5
For channeling their enrollees to contracted providers,
insurers are legally allowed to use out-of-network cost shar-
ing. A health insurer may require coinsurance to visit a non-
contracted provider, discouraging the use of this provider. In
addition to selective contracting, insurers are allowed to
designate preferred providers within their provider network
(i.e. formingtieredprovidernetworks).Toencouragepatients
to visit one of the designated preferred providers, an insurer
may decide to waive the annual deductible when they choose
to do so. In an attempt to stimulate Dutch health insurers to
manage care, they have been permitted by law to apply this
positive channeling incentive (i.e. financially rewarding
preferred provider choices) since 2009. It provides insurers
with another instrument to differentiate cost sharing rates
across provider tiers.
In 2009, 15 health insurers, representing about 58 % of
all Dutch enrollees, used a differential deductible for
channeling patients to preferred providers [12]. One of
these insurers was De Friesland Zorgverzekeraar (DFZ),
the largest regional health insurer in the Netherlands with a
market share of about 65 % in the Dutch province Fries-
land (or Frisia).6 At the national level DFZ had a market
share of only 3 % in 2009 [12].
Starting from January 2009, DFZ designated preferred
providers for two medical procedures: cataract surgery and
varicose veins treatment. For each procedure a set of pro-
viders was recognized as preferred because of above
average performance on guideline adherence, waiting time
and patient satisfaction. Each set included three hospitals
and one freestanding ambulatory surgery center. The lar-
gest hospital in Friesland was selected for both procedures.
In the communication to enrollees it was explained that the
preferred providers were carefully selected for reasons of
quality. Some positive points for each preferred provider
were summed up, such as the fact that a first appointment
was possible within 1 or 2 weeks. More detailed informa-
tion about the selection process was not disclosed. Fur-
thermore, DFZ pointed out that one would be exempted
from paying the deductible when visiting a preferred pro-
vider. This exemption would concern both the mandatory
deductible (155 € in 2009) and, where relevant, the vol-
untary deductible (at most 500 €).7 Since for both proce-
dures the national average of the insurer-provider
negotiated prices far exceeds the maximum deductible,8 the
difference in cost-sharing across the two tiers of providers
could add up to a maximum of 655 €. However, the
exemption would only apply for cataract surgery or vari-
cose veins treatment. Enrollees still had to pay their annual
deductible when using other medical services. With this
incentive design, the financial benefit of choosing a pre-
ferred provider was different among patient groups.
Enrollees who opted for a voluntary deductible in 2009 had
a higher potential financial benefit than enrollees with no
voluntary deductible. Patients with other medical expenses
in 2009 had a small financial benefit or no benefit at all.
In September 2009, DFZ decided to stop using the dif-
ferential deductible to channel patients as of January 2010
before properly evaluating its effect on the allocation of
patients across providers. According to a press release
issued by DFZ, the main reason underlying this over-hasty
decision was that a majority of enrollees reacted negatively
4 For more detailed information about the Dutch health care system,
see for example Schut and Van de Ven [22] and Schut et al. [21].
5 These sentiments are comparable to the managed care backlash that
occurred in the United States during the late 1990s [1, 6]. However,
the difference is that the Dutch backlash had already occurred before
managed care was being applied on a large scale.
6 Friesland is a province in the northwest of the Netherlands. Most of
Friesland is on the mainland, but it also includes four small islands
which are connected to the mainland by ferry. The total land area
equals 3349 km2. Friesland has a total population of 646,000 and a
population density of 190 inhabitants /km2: in 2010 the penultimate
population density in the Netherlands.
7 Some other insurers chose to apply the exemption only for the
mandatory deductible.
8 This information is obtained from the website http://www.open
disdata.nl/ (accessed on July 17, 2014). DFZ did not provide us with
information on their negotiated prices for confidentiality reasons.
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towards the differential deductible. They said that they
experienced it as an infringement on their freedom to
choose their own provider. Moreover, DFZ admitted that
due to a lack of reliable indicators it proved to be very
difficult to select providers performing above average on
clinical quality. To prevent any negative effects, i.e. losing
market share during the open enrollment period in
December 2009, DFZ therefore decided rather early to
discontinue this financial channeling incentive. Notice that
because the experiment did not continue after 1 year, the
possibility that patients may have (better) learned about the
channeling incentive and its financial benefit in later years
was ruled out beforehand.
Data and method
From DFZ we obtained for both procedures provider claims
data for the period January 2007 through December 2009,
including the provider name, date of admission and patient’s
zip code. In this study we only used claims concerning patients
residing in Friesland because the overwhelming majority of
this health insurer’s enrollees reside in this province. For all
DFZ enrollees who needed treatment for varicose veins and
cataract in 2007–2009 as much as 85 and 93 %, respectively,
lived in Friesland. Since the upper northwestern part of the
country is clearly the key geographical market of this insurer,
it is not surprising to find that all preferred providers are sit-
uated in the north of the Netherlands. Therefore, we focused
our analysis on providers in this part of the country that had a
contract with DFZ during each year of the period 2007–2009.
For both procedures in the sample period, DFZ did not con-
tract providers selectively. We only included providers which
admitted at least one enrollee in each sample year. Annually,
these providers accounted for around 98 % of the number of
Frisian enrollees needing treatment for varicose veins. For
cataract surgery this percentage was even closer to 100 %.
Our panel of providers delivering cataract surgery to
DFZ insured patients contained two ambulatory surgery
centers (both in the city of Groningen), one university
hospital (also in the city of Groningen) and seven general
hospitals. As illustrated in Fig. 1, four of them were des-
ignated as preferred provider. For varicose veins treatment,
the provider panel included two ambulatory surgery centers
(both located outside the Frisian province in the cities of
Alkmaar and Assen), one university hospital (in the city of
Groningen) and 9 general hospitals. Three of these provi-
ders were designated by the insurer as preferred providers.9
Each study sample contained data on patient volume for
each individual provider for the years 2007, 2008, and
2009. To calculate the total number of patients per provider
per year we used each patient’s first visit in the calendar
year for that procedure. About one third of the patients in
each study sample required more than one treatment.10
Because the percentage of these patients choosing different
providers was negligible (1.4 and 0.3 % for varicose veins
and cataract surgery, respectively), patients were included
only once to avoid double counting.
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variable
patient volume for the two study samples. From this
Table it follows that for both procedures, variation in the
number of patients across providers was substantial during
the 3-year study period.
To study the effect of the preferred provider status on
the allocation of patients across providers, we used a dif-
ference-in-difference approach. Providers in the sample
that were not designated as preferred provider in 2009
served as the control group. Table 2 shows for both study
samples total patient volume data broken down by pre-
ferred provider status and year. As described above, three
of the providers in the varicose veins sample were desig-
nated preferred provider in 2009 and four providers in the
cataract sample. When considering Table 2, the most
interesting observation is that in the varicose veins sample
the preferred providers in 2009 jointly experienced an
increase in patient volume, while their non-preferred
competitors suffered a decrease in patient volume. In the
cataract sample this difference is not observed. In this
market the preferred providers and non-preferred providers
both suffered a substantial decrease in number of patients,
though the percentage loss of patients was slightly smaller
for the first group of providers.
To test whether the status of preferred provider on
average had a statistically significant impact on patient
volume, we estimated two regression models: a fixed-ef-
fects model and a first-difference model. Since these
models are both very useful for program evaluation and
one is not better than the other [27], we used them both to
see whether or not they give the same results.
In the fixed-effects model, provider fixed effects were
included to prevent a bias in the coefficient for preferred
provider status resulting from omitted variables. Hence, we
used provider fixed effects to remove unobserved varia-
tions that were correlated with both preferred provider
status and patient volume. The provider fixed effect (ai), or
unobserved provider effect, captured all factors affecting
9 The fourth provider designated as preferred provider by DFZ, a
general hospital located relatively far away, was not included in our
study because none of the Frisian enrollees of DFZ visited this
provider in the sample period.
10 If there are cataracts in both eyes that require surgery, the surgeries
are normally not performed at the same time. Also, for people who
have varicose veins in both legs, treatment is commonly performed
apart.
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patient volume that were generally time-constant in the
3-year study period. In addition to, for example, the pro-
vider’s geographical location and its size, these effects
also included such attributes as clinical quality and repu-
tation.11 Similar to Sivey [24],12 we used provider fixed
effects to improve the validity of the estimate of the pre-
ferred provider status coefficient, which was our only
interest. The resulting fixed-effects model for patient vol-
ume was:13
Patientsit ¼ b1PREFit þ b2d2008t þ b3d2009t þ ai þ eit;
ð1Þ
where i denotes different providers and t denotes year of
admission (2007, 2008 or 2009). Hence, the total number
of observations is 36 and 30 for the study sample varicose
veins and cataract, respectively. The vector a includes the
provider fixed effects. The variables d2008 and d2009 are
dummy variables for 2008 and 2009, respectively. The key
independent variable is whether in the year of the experi-
ment a provider was designated as preferred provider or not
Fig. 1 Location of providers included in the two study samples.
Providers treating varicose veins and cataract are denoted with V and
C, respectively. Preferred providers are marked with an asterisk. The
province of Friesland is denoted by the thick dashed line to the east
and by the sea to the west
Table 1 Patient volume per year, by study sample
Varicose veins (n = 12) Cataract (n = 10)
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
Mean 162 182 186 297 345 300
Std. dev. 216 248 251 312 359 321
Minimum 1 1 1 2 2 2
Maximum 646 760 798 733 817 845
11 At the individual provider level, overall reputation (as measured
by a popular Dutch news magazine) was indeed strongly correlated
over the 3-year time period. The availability of public information
about clinical quality was very limited in the sample period.
12 In his study, Sivey [24] examined patient hospital choice for
cataract surgery in the United Kingdom, concentrating on the trade-
off between travel time and waiting time.
13 This model is similar to the equation used by Cutler et al. [4]
examining whether quality report cards in New York State and
Pennsylvania affected the distribution of patients across individual
providers of bypass surgery. Wang et al. [26] adopted a similar
estimation strategy when examining the impact of report cards on
providers’ patient volume in the market for bypass surgery in
Pennsylvania.
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(PREF). The estimated coefficient b1 represents the aver-
age change in patient volume for the preferred providers
compared to the non-preferred providers, other things
being equal.
In the first-differenced equation each variable is differ-
enced over time. As a result, the provider fixed effects (ai)
drop out. This gives:
DPatientsit ¼ b1DPREFit þ b2Dd2008t þ b3Dd2009t
þ Deit; ð2Þ
where i again denotes different providers and t now refers
to either 2008 or 2009. Hence, the total number of obser-
vations used for estimating the first-differenced equation is
24 and 20 for the study sample varicose veins and cataract,
respectively. As explained above, again our primary
interest is in coefficient b1.
Results
The top set of Table 3 shows the results of the fixed-effects
estimation. The bottom set of results is based on the first-
difference equation.
The fixed-effects results indicate that the preferred
provider status had a significant effect on the allocation of
patients across providers treating varicose veins. For this
treatment, being designated as preferred provider was, on
average, associated with an increase of 51 varicose veins
patients per year. The average preferred provider treats
about 276 patients per year, so for this hypothetical pro-
vider the percentage change in volume was about 18 %.
The coefficient on d2008 indicates that total patient volume
(i.e. aggregated for all providers) substantially increased
from 2007 to 2008.
The estimate in the first-difference equation also sug-
gests that preferred provider status on average increased
patient volume, but it is not statistically significant
(p value = 0.11). This may be the result of the decreased
sample size. Again, the intercept for 2008 in this model
shows that patient volume increased significantly for all
providers in this year. Based on the R2 it can be concluded
that the fixed-effects estimation better explains the
observed variation in providers’ patient volume when
compared to the first-difference equation.
In contrast to the impact on providers treating varicose
veins, the preferred provider status does not seem to
increase patient volume for preferred providers of cataract
surgery. The coefficient on the preferred provider status
variable is in both model specifications not statistically
different from zero.
Conclusion and discussion
Forming preferred provider networks may increase an
insurer’s bargaining clout if designating preferred providers
has a significant effect on the allocation of patients across
individual providers. The results from our analysis, using
claims data from a unique natural experiment where
Table 3 Fixed-effects and first-difference estimation of patient vol-
ume equation
Varicose veins Cataract
b SE b SE
Fixed-effects
PREF 50.94** 20.10 -23.54 31.05
d2008 19.58* 10.05 48.50** 17.57
d2009 10.68 11.24 12.92 21.51




DPREF 35.78 21.51 -47.92 37.82
Dd2008 19.58** 9.31 48.50** 18.53
Dd2009 14.47 14.22 22.67 30.25
Obs. 24 20
R2 0.26 0.46
The intercept reported in the fixed effects estimation is the average of
the provider-specific intercepts (ai)
* p = 0.1; ** p = 0.05; *** p = 0.01
Table 2 Patient volume of
preferred providers and non-
preferred providers, by study
sample
N 2007 2008 D (%) 2009 D (%) Total
Varicose veins
Preferred providers 3 712 839 ?17.8 931 ?11.0 2482
Non-preferred providers 9 1235 1343 ?8.7 1297 -3.4 3875
Total 12 1947 2182 ?12.1 2228 ?2.1 6357
Cataract
Preferred providers 4 2000 2311 ?15.6 2016 -12.8 6327
Non-preferred providers 6 968 1142 ?18.0 987 -13.6 3097
Total 10 2968 3453 ?16.3 3003 -13.0 9424
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enrollees from a large regional Dutch health insurer were
exempted from paying their deductible if they went to a
preferred provider, suggest that this strategy can be effective
in changing the allocation of patients across providers. We
found evidence that preferred providers of varicose veins
treatment on average experienced a significant increase in
patient volume relative to non-preferred providers. How-
ever, for cataract surgery no significant effect was found. We
can think of two possible reasons for the observed difference
in effectiveness between both procedures.
First, in the year prior to the experiment, the joint
market share of the preferred providers for varicose veins
treatment (38 %) was substantially smaller than the joint
market share of the preferred providers for cataract surgery
(67 %). Other things being equal, the higher this joint
market share, the lower the percentage of patients expected
to change from non-preferred to preferred providers in
2009. As a result of the insurer’s selection of preferred
providers, the potential number of cataract patients not yet
choosing a preferred provider was simply much smaller
than for varicose veins patients, which provides an ex ante
explanation for the observed difference in the channeling
strategy’s effectiveness between both procedures.
Second, the expected financial benefit associated with
choosing a preferred provider may have been higher for
varicose veins patients than for cataract patients. Due to the
design of the channeling incentive, the deductible exemp-
tion was only relevant for cataract surgery or varicose veins
treatment. According to data provided by the insurer, the
group of varicose veins patients was on average much
younger than the cataract patient group (51 and 73 years,
respectively). Consequently, given that health care expen-
ditures increase with age, we expect varicose veins patients
to have, on average, lower expenses for other medical
services than cataract patients. Hence, their probability of
exceeding the annual deductible was likely to be lower and
the expected financial benefit of choosing a preferred
provider therefore higher. This potential effect may have
been strengthened by the fact that 3 times as many varicose
veins patients as cataract patients opted for a voluntary
deductible additional to the mandatory one in 2009 (2.1
and 0.7 %, respectively). As a result, there are reasons to
assume that the differential deductible was more effective
as a channeling instrument for varicose veins patients than
for cataract patients.
In summary, our results suggest that the insurer’s patient
channeling experiment in 2009 changed the allocation of
varicose veins patients across providers. That is, a signifi-
cant increase in patient volume for preferred providers
treating varicose veins was found. However, whether this
increase was sufficient to strengthen the bargaining power
of the insurer, resulting in lower prices and/or better
quality, is an interesting empirical question that
unfortunately cannot be answered with the available data.
Future research should focus on the extent to which
insurers’ channeling strategies motivate health care provi-
ders to improve their performance.
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